Err, what would he do with the carriers? The northern seas mostly freeze in the winter and like other parts of the USSR could have been reached from bases on the ground. The Black Sea? Possible, but the Japanese had already proven that fighters could destroy anything on the sea.

Nothing's this simple, but these were the big errors as I saw them:

1. No plan for oil. The swing to the Caucasus was disastrous and wouldn't have yielded much petroleum anyway. Iran and Iraq would have been the real jewel, but after the pro-German generals were removed in Teheran, how do you get there? This was different than any other war before--from the start, it was total, but the whole strategy on how to get my people's treasured asset seemed improvised and not terribly serious.

2. Operations Marita and Enterprise 25, which delayed the launching of Barbarosa (to make up for il Duce's disastrous military adventures in Greece). That began in April. But it didn't just delay the launch of Barbarosa, but also required significant German and satellite troops to fight the Greek and Yugoslav communist partisans over the next four years.

3. That whole death camp thing. Look up Operation Ratweek some time and see how German troops could fight when they weren't diverting their fighting strength to persecuting civilians who never would have picked up a rifle to fight them anyway. They had no way out of the Balkan penninsula and fought gallantly. I think it was Admiral Horthy who said that the Germans started out as generals and became commissars.